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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a domestic relations action in which the sole issue on 
appeal is the custody of the parties' two-year old adopted daughter, 
Nicole Marie. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial was held before the Summit County District Court, the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding, on Wednesday, September 9, 1981, 
and Friday, October 2, 1981. Thereafter, the district court entered its 
Memorandum Decision (R. at 364-69) on October 26, 1981. That ruling 
found both parents to be fit but nevertheless awarded "temporary 
custody" to respondent Jack Michael Boals "while plaintiff is pursuing 
her studies, reserving to the plaintiff the right to bring the question 
of final custody before the court upon termination of her attendance at 
1 
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any university." (R. at 366.) Upon learning of the Court's ruling, 
appellant withdrew from· the doctorate program in which she had been 
enrolled' retained new counsel' and moved the court to alter or amend 
its decision. (R. at 388-389.) That motion was heard on December 7, 
1981, and the district court entered a second Memorandum Decision on 
December 8, 1981. (R. at 397 .) By that ruling, the court left 
"temporary custody" of the two-year old child with respondent "for a 
period of eighteen months from January 1, 1982, following which period 
of time plaintiff may petition the court to examine then existing 
circumstances and to then determine the matter of permanent custody." 
(R. at 399-400.) The Decree (R. at 447-451) and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. at 438-46) were entered on December 21, 1981. 
This appeal ensued. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Patricia Boals respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the award of custody (whether "temporary" or otherwise) and 
enter its order directing that she be awarded custody of her two-year 
old daughter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Patricia Boals (hereinafter "~.1rs. Boals") and 
respondent Jack Michael Boals (hereinafter "Mr. Boals") were married in 
Steelton, Pennsylvania, on November 21, 1973. (Tr. at 162.) During 
their marriage, the parties formally adopted Nicole Marie Boals, who was 
born on November 14, 1979. (Id.) At the time of the conclusion of the 
2 
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proceedings in the district court, Nichole Marie was just over two years 
of age. 
The action was tried to the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on 
September 9 and October 2, 1981. A number of witnesses were called to 
testify concerning the respective relationships of the parties with 
Nicole Marie and their ability to care for her. 
Without contradiction, the witnesses testified that Mrs. Boals 
appeared to be a good housekeeper, that she kept Nicole Marie clean, and 
that she cared properly for her physical needs. (Tr. at 11-12, 16, 28, 
40, and 197.) Mrs. Boals's witnesses also testified that she appeared 
to have an exemplary relationship with her daughter, displaying love and 
affection to her freely and disciplining her in an able and constructive 
fashion. There was testimony that when hurt or distressed Nicole Marie 
turned to Mrs. Boals. (Tr. at 12 and 40.) The Record also demonstrates 
that Mrs. Boals had been employed as a school psychologist and that she 
held a Masters Degree. In her professional employment, Mrs. Boals was 
responsible for the counseling of children and their parents. (Tr. at 
10-11.) 
Mr. Boals is a traveling salesman, spending most of his 
working time in a county other than that of his residence and occasion-
ally traveling out of state. The witnesses called at trial generally 
agreed that -he was a good father and appeared devoted to Nicole Marie. 
However, Mr. Boals admitted, at trial, that he somewhat routinely 
engaged in the use of marijuana and that on occasion he had used it in 
3 
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the presence of Nicole Marie. (Tr. at 44-45.) At a prior stage of the 
litigation, Mr. Boals had denied under oath the use of any illegal 
drugs. (Affidavit 11:5; R. at 25.) In attempting to justify his former 
untruthful testimony, Mr. Boals claimed that he did not know that the 
recreational use of marijuana was illegal in Utah. (Tr. at 44.) 
Testifying as an expert witness on behalf of :Mrs. Boals, 
Dr. Stephen E. Trotter expressed his opinion that she was an able and 
exemplary mother (Tr. at 28) and a stable individual (Tr. at 29). He 
also explained that a young female child would be best placed in the 
care of its mother. (R. at 432-33.) 
On behalf of Mr. Boals, a custody evaluation was prepared by 
G. Blaine Webster. (R. at 344.) That report suggested that Nicole 
Marie should be placed in the custody of her father, because she 
appeared to have a more "spontaneous" relationship with him. (R. at 
344.) Mr. Webster's professional qualifications are not impressive. He 
has only one year of graduate study in social work and possesses no 
degree. (Tr. at 88.) He had "just started doing" child custody 
evaulations and had completed only about a dozen and a half. (Tr. at 
97.) The evaluation was based upon several meetings. with .\ir. Boals; 
whereas, the evaluator did not see fit to meet with Mrs. Boals on more 
than one occasion. (Tr. at 89.) He also cancelled a scheduled 
appointment with Mrs. Boals. (Tr. at 92.) Mr. Boals made several 
additional unsolicited telephone calls to Mr. Webster while the 
evaluation was being considered. (Tr. at 98.) ~.1oreover, Mr. Webster's 
4 
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own report indicates that Mrs. Boals is a good mother who cared well for 
Nicole Marie (R. at 344) and he admitted at trial that his investigation 
"may have been somewhat one-sided" (Tr. at 89). Finally, ~1r. Webster 
admitted that the testimony concerning Mrs. Boals's parenting abilities 
presented at the trial was not consistent with his initial impressions, 
upon which his evaluation had been based. (Tr. at 99.) 
The only other witness who testified as an "expert" at the 
trial was Richard B. Snyder, called by Mr. Boals. Mr. Snyder, who 
resides in Pennsylvania, holds a master's degree in Zoology, with a 
minor in psychology. (Tr. at 204.) His employment has been as a 
criminal clinical psychologist.. (Id.) He testified that he felt Nicole 
should be placed in the custody of Mr. Boals. There existed, however, 
no basis whatsoever for his testimony. He acknowledged that he had 
never seen Mrs. Boals and Nicole :Marie together (Tr. at 209) and he 
admitted that he had only seen Mr. Boals with Nicole rfarie on two 
occasions. (Tr. at 220.) A review of the Record makes clear that his 
views were without substantial foundation and could be of no assistance 
in making a reasonable determination as to custody of Nicole ~.1arie. 
While in the custody of Mr. Boals during the pendency of the 
action, Nicole Marie spent most of her time with babysitters. This was 
recognized by Judge Croft in his original Memorandum Decision in which 
he noted that Mr. Boals would have to continue working, but would be 
able to continue the services of the babysitter. (R. at 365.) On the 
other hand, while Mrs. Boals candidly told the district court that she 
5 
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intended to continue her professional education to acquire a doctor's 
degree, she had been able to arrange her class schedule so that the 
services of a babysitter would be needed only three days a week. 
(Tr. at 104-05.) 
Following the district court's original Uemorandum Decision, 
Mrs. Boals elected to sacrifice her doctor's degree and withdrew from 
all classes. The district court, however, denied her motion to alter or 
amend the original ruling, noting in his second Memorandum Decision that 
the original ruling "was not based solely" upon Mrs. Boals's plans to 
further her education and the constraints that would thus be placed upon 
her time. (R. at 399.) The district court cryptically noted that 
"other factors were involved" in the original ruling. (Id.) Neither 
Judge Croft's Memorandum nor the formal Findings of Fact prepared by 
counsel for Mr. Boals and entered by the district court gave the 
parties, their counsel, or this Court any insight into the nature of 
these "other factors" secretly harbored by Judge Croft. 
ARGUMENT 
POlNT- i. IN THIS EQUITABLE ACTION, THIS COURT MAY 
REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS. 
While due deference must be extended to the views of the trial 
judge who had a personal opportunity to observe the wittnesses, this 
Court is by no means bound by the express or implicit findings of fact 
reached by the trial court. This is a custody matter and, therefore, 
6 
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highly equitable in nature. In such an action, it is the duty of this 
Court to review and consider questions both of law and of fact. As 
noted in Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970): 
This is an equitable matter, and 
upon appeal the binding effect of the 
findings made by the trial court differs 
from that in a law matter. We may here 
review questions of both law and fact; 
and after making due allowance for the 
advantaged position of the trial judge to 
observe the demeanor of witnesses upon 
the stand, we may be pursuaded that a 
finding is against the preponderance of 
the evidence to such an extent that we 
would be justified in disapproving it or 
even making a finding of our own. 
469 P. 2d at 505 (numerous citations omitted). In that case, this Court 
rejected the trial court's determination that a child's best interests 
would be served by placing him in the custody of his father, reversed 
the trial court, and entered a decree awarding custody to the mother. 
PO}NT- II. OTHER FACTORS BEING RELATIVELY EQUAL 
AND BOTH PARENTS HAVING BEEN FOUND FIT, CUSTODY SHOULD HA VE 
BEEN AWARDED TO THE MOTHER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF A YOUNG CHILD ARE SERVED BY 
MATERNAL CUSTODY. 
The trial court clearly found both parents to be fit. 
(Findings of Fact UO, R. at 440.) The trial court also recognized that 
Mr. Boals had only limited time available to him for the care of Nicole 
~farie and would have to resort to the utilization of babysitters· 
7 
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(R. at 365.) Under these circumstances, the factors weighing in favor 
of custody to each of the parties were relatively balanced. 
When the factors relevant to a custody determination are 
approximately evenly balanced, this Court has long adhered to the 
principle that custody should be awarded to the mother. This proposi-
tion was clearly articulated by this Court in Cox v. Cox, 532 P. 2d 994 
(Utah 1975). In that case, the trial court found that both parents were 
"fit"; that the wife's conduct had been "less than exemplary" and that 
she spent more time away from home "than she should have"; but that the 
mother also managed a "well-ordered" home, kept her children clean, and 
provided good meals. Having found the factors to be relatively balanced 
between the husband and wife, this Court held that the wife should be 
awarded custody due to the presumption that the best interests of the 
child are served through maternal custody, noting: 
[ U] nder the modern and realistic 
trend of law, the mother has no absolute 
or invariable right to be awarded the 
custody of the children; and that the 
father's rights and interests are 
entitled to equal and just consideration. 
But this does not mean that the 
law must pretend to be unaware of and 
blindly ignore obvious and essential 
biological differences. 
In addition to and quite beyond 
the rights of the parents, there is the 
important principle that the paramount 
consideration is the long-term welfare 
and adjustment of the children. That 
being so, we think there is wisdom in the 
traditional patterns of thO\~ght that the 
roles of the mother and father in the 
8 
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family are such that, all other thin gs 
being comparatively equal, the children 
should be in the care of their mother, 
especially so children of younger years; 
and that this may be true even where the 
divorce is granted to the father. 
532 P. 2d at 996 (footnote citations omitted, emphasis added). In the 
present case, all relevant factors were "comparatively equal"; there-
fore, the trial court erred in failing to award Mrs. Boals custody of 
her two-year-old daughter. 
This Court relied upon this presumption in reversing the trial 
court's custody determination in Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 
293 P. 2d 418 (1956). The facts of that case are strikingly similar to 
those of the present. The trial court determined that neither the 
mother nor the father was a "fit" parent to have custody but noted that 
the father's parents would act as babysitters. Accordingly, the trial 
court awarded custody to the father on a "temporary" basis. Thus, as in 
the present case, the trial court found that both parents were equally 
qualifi~d to have custody, determined that the father had access to a 
good babysitter, and made the award "temporary". This Court reversed, 
holding that custody should have been awarded to the mother: 
[I]t appears that [the mother] has been 
in the past careless and indiscreet, but 
that her love for the child has caused 
her to work to provide for him, has 
caused her to spend her free time with 
him, and care for his needs, and has 
caused her to fight for his custody. In 
light of these facts it cannot be said 
that she is an unfit mother. 
9 
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This court has stated that a 
divorced mother has no absolute right to 
the custody of minor children • • • but 
the policy of our decisions has been to 
give weight to the view that all things 
being equal, preference should be given 
to the mother in awarding custody of a 
child of tender years, notwithstanding 
the divorce is granted to the father. 
And this view is based upon the 
oft-stated purpose of the award of 
custody to provide for the child's best 
interests and welfare • • • • 
There is no proof in the record that 
this mother drinks excessively so as to 
render her unable to properly care for 
the child, nor is there any evidence of 
promiscuity. The trial court apparently 
felt that the child could be provided 
with a better home than that offered by 
the [mother] and made his order so that 
she would improve the conditions of the 
house and her associations, but in so 
doing, he has failed to give proper 
weight to other factors here involved. 
293 P. 2d at 420 (numerous citations omitted). Mrs. Boals is far more 
qualified for custody than the mother in Steiger; accordingly, the trial 
court erred in failing to grant her custody of her daughter. 
Another case in which this Court reversed a custody award 
based upon the presumption or preference for maternal custody is Dearden 
v. Dearden, 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1964). In that case, the 
trial court found that neither parent typified an exemplary parent but 
ruled that the interests of the parties' two-and-one- half-year-old 
daughter would be best served by placing her in the custody of the 
father. On appeal, this Court reversed, noting that the wife was a 
10 
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"fine housekeeper", and that there was "no evidence that she ha[d] 
directly or intentionally mistreated the child." ·This Court also 
observed that the mother had 
demonstrated that she love[d] her 
daughter by caring for her and providing 
for her needs. This is, of course, but 
natural to expect and is the reason for 
the universaily recognized . pr-esum};)tion 
that it is for the best interest and 
welfare of a child of' such tender years 
to be with her mother. In such instance, 
the mother's right to custody should not 
be denied unless it is shown that she is 
such an immoral, incompetent or otherwise 
improper person that it would be contrary 
to the child's best interest and welfare 
to be in her custody. . 
388 P. 2d 23 2 (footnote citation omitted, emphasis added). 
Not only has the proposition that there exists a presumption 
that a child, particularly of a young age, should be placed in the 
custody of its mother enjoyed the consistent approval of this Court, 
that approval has been recently reaffirmed. In Smith v. Smith, 564 
P. 2d 307 (Utah 1977), this Court noted that while the presumption or 
preference was not of statutory origin, it was nevertheless the 
"invariably declared· policy" of this state: 
[A] ppropriate to be considered is 
the fact that, irrespective of any 
statute, the invariably declared policy 
stated in our decisions is that "all 
things else being equal, preference 
should be given to the mother in awarding 
custody of children of tender years (and 
this is true even when) the divorce is 
granted to the father." 
564 P. 2d at 309 (footnote citation omitted). Thus, the presumption or 
11 
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preference finds firm support in the recent decisions of this Court. 
Other cases recognizing and approving the preference include Bingham v. 
_Bingham, 575 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1978); Hyde v ~ Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 
454 P. 2d 884 (1969); D--P-- v. Social Servfoe anci Child ·welfare 
Department, 19 Utah 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967); and McBroom v. McBroom, 
14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963). 
A very similar preference or presumption was recently 
recognized by this Court in Hutchison v. ·autc:hison, -- P. 2d -- (Utah 
June 14, 1982). In that case, this Court noted that in custody 
matters, 
the paramount consideration is the best 
interest of the child, but where one 
party to the controversy is a non-parent, 
there is a presumption in favor of the 
natural parent. • . . [This presumption] 
is rooted in the common experience of 
mankind, which teaches that parent and 
child normally share a strong attachment 
or bond for each other, that a natural 
parent will normally sacrifice personal 
interest and welfare for the child's 
benefit, and that a natural parent is 
normally more sympathetic and understand-
ing and better able to win the confidence 
and love of the child than anyone else. 
-- P. 2d at -- • This Court, in that case, proceeded to articulate a 
comprehensive list of factors that could be considered in determining to 
whom custody should be awarded in the event that the presumption was 
rebutted. While the preference or presumption for maternal custody is 
not among the criteria enumerated, its absence is explained by its 
12 
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inherent inapplicability to a parent/non-parent custody controversy and 
is not indicative of any ·departure by this Court from the "invariably 
declared" presumption of maternal custody. 
Accordingly, unless the district court specifically found that 
for some specified reason the relative means or abilities of Mr. Boals 
to care for Nicole Marie were substantially greater than those of 
Mrs. Boals, the district court could not properly award custody to 
Mr. Boals. 
POiNT ·ni. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ENTERED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT 
ITS AWARD OF CUSTODY TO THE FATHER. 
In the formal Findings of Fact entered by the trial court, 
which were prepared by counsel for Mr. Boals, only two paragraphs relate 
to the custody issue. In the first, the trial court finds that "each of 
the parties is a fit and proper parent" to have custody of Nicole Marie. 
(Findings UO, R. at 440.) In the second, it is merely noted that "a 
_custody evaluation was performed in this matter by Blaine Webster" and 
that Mr. Webster recommended that custody be awarded to Mr. Boals. 
(Findings Ul, R. at 440.) Accordingly, there is not a single formal 
Finding of Fact sufficient to support an award of custody to Mr. Boals. 
Even considering the two Memorandum Decisions entered by the 
trial court, no substantial findings of fact can be found. In his 
original Memorandum Decision, Judge Croft noted the plans of ~·.1rs. Boals 
13 
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to pursue her doctor's degree and obse.rved that she would likely have to 
be employed to some extent in order to finance that endeavor. However, 
the court also accurately noted that :Mr. Boals was employed and that his 
employment required the "substantial portion of his time" and that he 
would "have to rely upon the services of babysitters." (R. at 365.) 
Thus, at most, the "available time" factor was, by the court's own 
acknowledgment, evenly divided between the parties. 
A. tlie· ·Presuinpiion- Fav-ciriilg ·Maternai-Custody- ·was -Not-Re1iuffe<f ·and-the· 
District ·court· :Erre<f m. · AwarCiirig- cusfocty- tO-tlie -Fatlier. 
Not only do the limited Findings of Fact entered by the 
district court not contain any express or specific finding that 
Mr. Boals is in some way better able to care for Nicole Marie, those 
Findings make clear that both parents are equally fit and capable of 
caring for Nicole Marie. Accordingly, the presumption or preference for 
maternal custody has not been rebutted and the district court erred in 
awarding custody of Nicole Marie to Mr. Boals. 
It is true that the extent to which each parent may be able to 
care personally for the child is an appropriate criterion to be 
considered by the trial court. (See, Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 
1981).) In this case, however, the district court made no determination 
that Mr. Boals would be able to spend more time with Nicole Marie or to 
care for her personally to a greater extent than t1rs. Boals. There is 
no formal Finding of Fact on this issue whatsoever. Moreover, Judge 
14 
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Croft's original Memorandum Decision recognizes that Mr. Boals was 
er:iployed as a traveling salesman and would have "to rely upon the 
services of babysitters." (R. at 365.) By contrast, Mrs. Boals 
contemplated attending class only three days per week and abandoned even 
that for the sake of her daughter. Thus, the trial court's custody 
award cannot be justified upon the basis that Mr. Boals would have a 
greater amount of time to spend with the child. 
a. '!'he n1St-rict cou-rt's -:Failure- to- Enter- speciffo -:Firidlrigs of -:Fact-
Coristifo.tes -&eversil>ie -:Error. 
This Court has consistently held that detailed, formal 
Findings of Fact are essential if the decision of the trial court is to 
be meaningfully reviewed on appeal. For example, in Stoddard v. 
Stoddard, 642 P.2d 743 (1982), this Court held: 
Written findings and conclusions 
setting out the basis on which a court's 
decision rests are vital to the proper 
information of the parties and to the 
proper functioning of courts. Findings 
and conclusions aid the trial court in 
rational decision making • • • and aid 
the appellate court in the exercise of 
the discretion it enjoys to review, and, 
if necessary, to adjust the financial and 
property interests of the parties. • • . 
642 P. 2d at 7 44 (citation omitted). This court vacated the trial 
court's Decree and remanded the case for proper proceedings. A case 
such as the present strongly underscores the need for the trial court 
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to articulate the specific facts upon which it believes its decision 
rests. 
Similarly, in Chandler v. West, 610 P. 2d 1299 (1980), this 
Court again remanded a case to the trial court because of the absence of 
specific fin din gs of fact. It was noted: 
For this Court to be in a position to 
review the propriety of the trial court's 
order, it is necessary that proper 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
be made pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
610 P.2d at 1301. 
Moreover, conclusory generalizations cannot adequately fulfill 
the requirement of specific Findings of Fact. In Wiese v. W~~~~' 
24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970), this Court noted that a so-called 
finding of fact to the effect that "the best interest of the boys would 
lie in their remaining with their father" was not, in reality, a finding 
of fact at all. Rather, this Court held it was "a conclusion and must 
be based upon the other findings". 469 P. 2d at 505. Having determined 
that the award of custody to the father could not be supported by the 
trial court's other findings of fact, this Court reversed, awarding 
custody to the mother. Id. at 507. 
In the present case, the trial court wholly failed to 
articulate any substantial findings of fact in support of its decision 
to award custody of two-year-old Nicole ~.1arie to Mr. Boals. The trial 
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court's veiled reference to "other factors" is wholly insufficient to 
support its decision. 
CONCLUSION 
In this appeal from the trial court's award of custody, this 
Court must consider and review the questions of fact as well as the 
questions of law raised. This Court has long and firmly adhered to the 
proposition that, when other relevant factors are comparatively evenly 
balanced, there exists a strong and natural presumption that the best 
interests of a child, and particularly of a young child, are served by 
granting custody to the mother. 
In this case, not only has Mrs. Boals the personal traits and 
stability to serve as an exemplary mother to her daughter, she possesses 
a high level of professional training and expertise as a school 
psychologist. She has manifest her devotion to her daughter through her 
willingness to sacrifice further professional advancement in order to 
provide an even better environment for her. Mr. Boals, on the other 
hand, as a traveling salesman, must rely upon the services of hired 
babysitters to care for Nicole Marie and has admitted at best demon-
strating poor judgment in connection with his personal indulgences in 
the child's presence. 
Without a single specific supporting Finding of Fact, the 
district court has awarded custody to Ur. Boals, thus failing to apply 
the relevant law of this State. That judgment must be reversed and 
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custody of two-year-old Nicole Marie must be awarded to appellant 
Patricia Boals. 
RESPECTFULLY S UB1\1ITTED this 1,\<?5 day of July, 1982. 
DART & STEGALL 
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on this~ day of July, 1982, I mailed two 
copies of the foregoing Brief with postage prepaid to David S. Dolowitz, 
attorney for respondent, 79 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84lll. 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
